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Americans are inherently practical people, preferring the immediate and the tangible to the long-range and the
intangible. This characteristic has brought us immense success in all realms of life, but it also complicates the process
of crafting a coherent national security strategy. By focusing too much on the immediate and the tangible, we can
easily lapse into strategic myopia, thus simply postponing tough decisions and allowing small threats to grow into large
ones. This is particularly true during periods of strategic transition such as the current one.
A huge array of factors must be considered as we attempt to design a coherent post-Cold War national security
strategy. These include not only the traditional elements of strategy such as politics, economics, and the military
balance, but also newer forces such as social trends, value changes, demographics, mass psychology, the expansion of
communications and information technology, and environmental concerns. But of the factors that will shape future US
national security strategy and the military force required to execute it, the most amorphous and difficult to analyze is
the nature of the international system itself. This is the foundation for all strategy.
Thinking at such a high level of abstraction can seem alien and esoteric to security professionals confronting the press
of day-to-day problems where in-baskets rather than international systems take priority. System-level analysis is
intensely, sometimes overwhelmingly complex. The tendency, then, is to avoid it in favor of more immediate and
seemingly easier issues. But over the long term, the macro-level nature of the international system may be the most
vital element of a coherent strategy. It is simultaneously ethereal and relevant, driving consideration of the appropriate
force structure and procedures for applying national power. For this reason, astute strategists simply must speculate on
this topic.
At this point, we cannot know precisely what form the post-Cold War international system will take. We can,
however, develop a range of possibilities based on past patterns and current trends. These can be distinguished by a
number of factors, including:
the configuration and composition of the system
the norms or principles that dominate the system
the sources of conflict within the system
the role of military force
the process of change within the system
Most important, once a range of feasible alternatives is developed, we can then discern the security implications of
each and thus approach the task of long-term strategy formulation with at least some basic guidelines.
Unipolar Systems
Unipolar systems represent the ultimate concentration of power. In them, the core consists of one unit; the remaining
elements of the system are secondary powers or part of the periphery. There is no historic example of a global unipolar
system, only regional ones such as the Roman, Mongol, and Chinese empires. But since the current global
configuration of power is loosely unipolar, it is possible to conceive of a post-Cold War system in which the United
States remains the sole superpower. After all, no other state is likely to challenge American military superiority in the
near future, and, while the other elements of national power are more dispersed throughout the system, no other state is
a first-tier actor in all the elements of power.[1] But in the modern world, a sound argument can be made that
unipolarity is temporary and abnormal because modernity has sped up the systemic cycles of the concentration and
dispersion of power. Unipolarity also runs counter to the American strategic tradition.[2] After all, the dispersion and

balancing of political power forms the absolute essence of our own domestic political system, and thus we prefer a
similar configuration in the international political system.
Given that the United States is unlikely to sustain the exertions of hegemony, a unipolar system in which some other
unit forms the core could emerge. In at least the mid-term, this is unlikely unless there is a dramatic collapse of
American power or will, but it is still feasible. The new hegemon could be a regional coalition or bloc such as the
European Community or a supranational global organization like the United Nations or its descendent. Less likely but
still worth mentioning is the possibility that a nongovernmental organization such as a super-consortium of
corporations could replace nation-states as the locus of global power.
In the short- and mid-term, a future unipolar system would include both nation-states and non-state actors. There is a
sophisticated and large analytical literature that argues that the nation-state, which is essentially an invention of the
17th century, is obsolete and incapable of dealing with modern, transnational problems.[3] In fact, James N. Rosenau
notes that the world is already "bifurcated" as nation-states share power with a web of diverse, relatively autonomous
non-state actors.[4] Nonetheless, nation-states are likely to persist as an important (if not necessarily the only) element
of the international system because of their monopoly on military power and the tradition of nationalism. People are
accustomed to paying loyalty to nation-states, and this cannot change overnight. Few if any non-state actors can
inspire the extent of support that nation-states can, and no non-state actors can mobilize, train, equip, and sustain a
large military. But there is no question that increasing personal mobility, economic interdependence, and global
communications will continue to erode traditional notions of sovereignty. The time when a nation such as Mao's
China, Stalin's Soviet Union, or Hoxha's Albania could cut itself off from the rest of the world is rapidly passing.
Those attempting it, such as North Korea and Myanmar (formerly Burma), will soon pay the price. This means that the
importance of non-state actors--whether economic organizations such as cartels, corporations, and consortia, or
political ones such as the UN--will also continue to grow.
The principles of a future unipolar system would depend on whether the system is an imperial one, in which the
hegemon imposes its power, or a consensual one, in which the smaller units willingly accept the authority and power
of the hegemon. If it is an imperial system, history suggests that there would be three guiding principles:
No smaller unit alone should directly challenge the hegemon.
The amount of conflict on the periphery would be determined by the tolerance of the hegemon.
The smaller units would attempt to organize, either formally or informally, to constrain the hegemon within
parameters allowed by the hegemon. As the hegemon loses its will or declines, the impulse to constrain the
hegemon will become more frequent and more formal, eventually leading to the dispersion of power in the
system.
An imperial system can be held together primarily by military force or by cultural and economic interests. The most
successful and long-lived empires throughout history have been those initially formed by military force, but then held
together by cultural and economic linkages. Examples include the Roman Empire, the Arab/Islamic Empire, the
British Empire and Commonwealth, and the various Chinese dynastic empires. Imperial systems forged in war that
failed to generate a unifying culture and economy, such as those of Alexander and Genghis Khan, fell apart rapidly.
History very strongly suggests that unipolar systems in which consensus-building and diplomacy form the primary
currency of relations between the core and periphery are more survivable than those based solely on force. The
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the evolution of terrorism add to the dangers and burdens of imperial
hegemony, and thus make this distinction even more true.
Since there is no exact historic precedent for a consensual unipolar system, the closest analogies are nation-states that
emerged from the voluntary unification of smaller units (for example, the United States and Switzerland). Thus it is
likely that the guiding principles of a consensual unipolar system would be, first, the power and authority of the central
organization grows at the expense of its constituent units, and second, the right of voluntary separation or succession
would eventually fade to the point that any such attempts would be met with force.
There are two primary sources of conflict within a unipolar system. The first arises when the hegemon is unable to

impose its will in a benign fashion. In all historic unipolar systems, there are Saddam Husseins who underestimate the
power or will of the hegemon. If their challenge fails, the system survives; if their rebellion succeeds, the system
begins evolving into a bipolar or multipolar configuration. A second type of conflict arises between secondary or
peripheral actors when the hegemon is unconcerned. A unipolar system would experience the same sorts of internal
conflicts as bipolar or multipolar systems. These could be vertical conflicts between the elite and non-elite (traditional
revolution) or horizontal ones pitting ethnic, religious, client, racial, clan, ideological, or political groups. Historically,
such internal conflicts challenge the foundation of the international system only if they are very widespread or generate
conflict between units, as did the Chinese and Russian revolutions. A major determinant is the hegemon's perspective
on internal conflict. If the hegemon considers it a challenge to the system, then it is likely to take steps to contain or
quash internal conflict. If the hegemon takes a more benign view of internal conflict at the periphery of the system, it
will be widespread. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction may, however, deny this benign perspective to
the hegemon. Even a strictly internal war using them will have immense environmental and humanitarian implications
and may very likely provoke outside intervention by the hegemon or with its approval. Phrased differently, it is very
unlikely that any sort of effective hegemon could refrain from intervention in a nuclear civil war.
The role of military force in a unipolar system would depend on whether it was consensual or imperial. In an imperial
system, military force would remain very important. Military force would be used by the hegemon to retain control
and, if the hegemon appears to be in decline, by secondary and peripheral states seeking to reorganize the system.
Military force would also be used within states if the hegemon had a high tolerance for internal conflict. In a
consensual system or in an imperial one in which the hegemon succeeded in changing from military to cultural or
economic forms of control, military force would decline in importance. Its greatest utility would be during the initial
consolidation of the system and during its dying days (as at the end of the Chinese, Soviet, Russian, French, or
Ottoman empires) when the appeal of secession or autonomy is high.
It is possible to discuss the process of change in a future system in only the broadest terms. Two forces will lead to
change in the system and eventually to its downfall. One is a decline in the hegemon's will or ability to rule. For a
variety of reasons, hegemons eventually decide that the burdens of empire are greater than the benefits. And, as Paul
Kennedy argued, this is sped by the fact that empires tend to rely on military force since that was usually responsible
for their ascent to power, and thus ignore their own economic health.[5] At the same time, challengers emulate
whatever it was that generated the hegemon's power, and thus power disperses throughout the system. Germany's
acquisition in the late 19th century of a navy and empire--the two things considered by Mahan and others to form the
cornerstones of British power--was an illustration of this form of emulation. Eventually it helped speed the dissolution
of the Eurocentric system.
A second force challenging unipolar systems is the unwillingness of secondary powers to stay in that position.
Hegemony is particularly alluring to those who do not have it, thus leading to challenges to the hegemon. Over time,
these challenges wear the hegemon down, either spiritually or physically. Along these same lines, it appears that
current trends favor the dispersion rather than the concentration of economic power. Wealth is now more informationintensive than production-intensive. The widespread use of microcomputers, facsimile machines, computer assisted
design, and cellular communications disperses information where, in the past, large-scale industrialism concentrated
wealth. This encourages the dispersion of economic power. During past periods of unipolarity the hegemon parlayed
military preponderance into economic, political, and ideological superiority. Any future candidate hegemon would find
this difficult to do given the global dispersion of information-based economic power.
In summary, Americans will not allow a non-US dominated unipolar system. World War I, World War II, and the
Cold War showed that this is simply unacceptable. But it is equally unlikely that the American public will support an
imperial unipolar system or that the rest of the world will tolerate a consensual unipolar system for long. Historically,
unipolarity emerged in a regional system when one actor leaped ahead of its contemporaries in the application of
power, whether military (the Mongols), political and organizational (the Romans), or psychological/ideological (the
Arabs). The communications revolution has made such a leap unlikely. Emulation is simply too easy and too fast. All
indicators are, then, that Charles Krauthammer was correct when he suggested that the current unipolarity of the
international system is a fleeting aberration.[6]
Bipolar Systems

Americans are certainly comfortable with the notion of bipolarity. A whole generation of strategists and policymakers
came of age during the Cold War, and thus views bipolarity as the natural state of the international system. Bipolarity
is somewhat more stable and sustainable than unipolarity. If, then, the United States musters the will and the means to
remain a superpower and the traditional opposition to unipolarity matures, the post-Cold War system may be bipolar,
at least in its initial stages. The key question is: Who or what will be the second superpower? It may be some other
nation-state. There are several logical candidates: a revived Russia, an economically dynamic China, a United States
of Europe, or a Japan that combines economic power with political ambition and military might. The new superpower
might also be a non-state actor. The most likely candidate here would be a greatly strengthened United Nations that
had somehow slipped out of the United States' control through changes in structure or procedure.
An even more likely configuration is a bipolar system in which the two opposing superpowers are groupings of nationstates. This would be similar to the Cold War system which pitted the Warsaw Pact against NATO, but the difference
would be that the blocs would be less internally hierarchical. Economics could be the criterion for bloc membership. If
so, feasible systemic configurations include:
Asia versus the Americas and Europe
the Americas versus Asia and Europe
Europe versus Asia and the Americas
North versus South
By contrast, the superpowers could also be culturally defined, probably pitting the "West" against the non-West. This is
similar to Samuel Huntington's notion that a "clash of civilizations" is replacing the ideological fissures of the Cold
War.[7] Ideological conflict could also reemerge, perhaps in the guise of democratic versus non-democratic groupings
of states, or even a revived struggle between communism and capitalism.
Both nation-states and non-state actors will be important in any future bipolar system. The relative power of the two
will be determined by the degree of conflict in the system and the utility of military force. To the extent the system is
conflictual and military force retains a high utility, nation-states will be more important than non-state actors. To the
extent that the system is based on cooperative relationships and the peaceful resolution of conflicts, non-state actors
such as the United Nations will be more important.
In bipolar systems, there are two alternative sets of principles. Conflictual bipolar systems are based on containment.
An example was the pre-détente Cold War system. Each core power in a conflictual bipolar system seeks to expand its
influence at the expense of the other. The system, then, is zero-sum, with any gain in power by one superpower
automatically considered a loss for the other. Conflict in the system gives military force a high utility for deterrence,
enforcement of superpower control over allies and clients, and adjudicating superpower competition in gray areas of
the system.
In cooperative bipolar systems the core powers are content with their spheres of influence, do not encourage instability
in the other's sphere, and may actually cooperate to preserve order in the periphery. This is a fairly stable arrangement;
it was the type of system sought by Nixon and Kissinger during the détente period of the Cold War. In a cooperative
bipolar system, military power would decline in utility. Its primary role would be deterrence and a means of preserving
intra-bloc order when all other means failed. A cooperative bipolar system would be contingent on some degree of
similarity between the two superpowers. It is difficult to conceive of a cooperative bipolar system in which the two
core powers are different types of units (geographic nation-state, coalition of states, ideological blocs). If, for example,
the United States and a powerful UN were the two superpowers, it would be nearly impossible for them to clearly
delineate and respect spheres of influence. It is ironic but true that one of the foundations of the Cold War system was
a similarity between the United States and the Soviet Union that was at least as important as the stark distinctions
between them. Both were large, heterogeneous nation-states unified by a set of shared values derived from European
roots, but at the periphery of the European tradition.[8]
In any bipolar system, conflict arises between units when:
an area is not clearly in one sphere or the other (for example, the Korean War)

a unit attempts to transfer from one sphere to the other (Ethiopia and Somalia in the late 1970s)
one of the superpowers perceives exploitable weakness in the other superpower or adverse trends (the Soviet
offensive in the Third World following Vietnam and Watergate)
the intentions or capabilities of another unit are misperceived (the Gulf War)[9]
a unit seeks to distract its public from domestic problems (the Falklands War, or Czarist Russia during the
Balkans crisis leading to World War I)
The causes of conflict within units are the same as for the unipolar system: elite/non-elite struggle, and competition
between political, ideological, or identity groups.
At the systemic level, change in a bipolar system is usually driven by the weakening of one or both superpowers. Since
bipolarity emerges only when there is rough parity between the core powers, this weakening is usually caused by
events within the superpower or its bloc, but it can be exacerbated or accelerated by the actions of the other core
power, as with the American defense buildup of the 1980s. The weakening can come from military conflict within the
bloc, social upheaval, economic decay, or simply a loss of will by the elite. The end of the bipolar conflict in early
17th-century Europe, for example, was due more to the internal problems of Spain than the strategic skill of France. It
may lead to the collapse of one superpower and the emergence of a temporary unipolar system or to major war as
either the weakening power feels its opportunities are slipping away or the other power sees the chance to destroy its
enemy. In ancient Greece, overextension led to Athenian military decline (especially in naval power) and sparked
debilitating war among the city-states with Sparta--Athens' rival--the eventual victor. The weakening of a superpower
may also lead to the transformation of the bipolar system to a multipolar one as the superpower's control over its bloc
fades.
Global trends toward improved communications and transportation, greater personal mobility, and economic
interdependence also erode bipolarity. The basis of bipolarity is distinction. Each bloc must define the other as
"different." Personal contact and economic exchanges make it difficult to sustain this distinction. This is precisely
what happened at the end of the Cold War. It was not only the economic decay of the Soviet Union that led to its
collapse, but also the growing openness of that country. It is only a slight overstatement to say that the combination of
SDI and CNN brought the end of the Cold War. The same process is now under way in China, although it is economic
vibrancy rather than decay that is eroding the old political system. This may suggest that bipolarity itself is an obsolete
configuration for the international system.
Multipolar Systems
If frequency of occurrence and long-term survivability are indicators, multipolar systems are the most natural of the
three forms. This is primarily due to their flexibility. In a system with three or more core elements, power is diffused
and fluid coalitions preserve the system and prevent any one power from dominating it. While all historic multipolar
systems have had their share of conflict, they do tend to be better than tight bipolar systems at limiting wars.[10]
The key elements of a future multipolar system would most likely be regions or some other form of supra-state
grouping rather than individual nation-states. In terms of the actual composition of the core, the most stable multipolar
systems throughout history have been those with five major actors. Given this, the core of a future multipolar system
might include:
the Western Hemisphere under the leadership of the United States
Europe under the leadership of Germany
the Pacific rim under the leadership of Japan
the Asian mainland under the leadership of China
the Islamic world under the leadership of Egypt, Iraq, Iran, or Saudi Arabia
Note that in this configuration, all except the Islamic world are essentially economic blocs with a clear leader. This
would make the Islamic bloc the least stable, and thus the source of much systemic conflict. Other possible (but less
likely) members would be economic blocs such as south Asia under the leadership of India, or sub-Saharan Africa
under the leadership of South Africa.

If the system were defined primarily by culture, ideology, or, to use Huntington's phrase, civilizations rather than
economics, the core might be composed of:
the traditional West (United States, Western Europe, Canada, Australia, New Zealand), consisting of
representative democracies
Eastern Europe under the leadership of Russia, consisting of unstable multi-party democracies, single-party
democracies, or, possibly, authoritarian states
the Islamic world, consisting primarily of single-party democracies or authoritarian states
Latin America, possibly under the leadership of Brazil or, less likely, Mexico, consisting of both stable and
unstable multi-party democracies
Asia under the leadership of China, India, or Japan, consisting of multi-party democracies, single-party
democracies, and authoritarian states
In such a system, the major sources of conflict would not be between the blocs composing the core of the system, but
within them. There would invariably be intense competition for leadership within the Islamic bloc (as there has been
since the death of the Prophet) and in Asia, while Russia's domination of Eastern Europe would generate persistent
problems. Another major source of conflict would be "cusp" states that could belong in more than one bloc, such as
Germany, Mexico, and Turkey. The macro-level stability of a multipolar system depends on the internal stability of the
blocs composing the core. Core blocs thus often act to preserve order within other core blocs. The United States,
United Kingdom, and France, for example, intervened (unsuccessfully) in the Russian Civil War. Outside support to
the Austrian emperor during the upheavals of 1848 was more effective. In any future multipolar system, intervention to
prop up or stabilize a weak member would be a persistent source of conflict.
The dominant principles of a future multipolar system would vary according to whether it was essentially cooperative
or conflictual. In a conflictual system--especially one defined by culture or ideology--conflict would arise from
attempts to preserve order within blocs. States would jockey for power within blocs, and the dominant states within a
bloc would attempt to prevent disassociation or rebellion by other bloc members--the "Brezhnev Doctrine" would form
a general norm. The blocs would be internally homogeneous in ideology, but there would not be a system-wide
concept of human rights. Conflict would also occur between blocs, particularly when one is in decline. It was, after all,
the decline of the Ottoman Empire that spawned much of the conflict leading to the downfall of the traditional
Eurocentric system. A likely principle of such a system, then, would be that the dominant state in a bloc controls
external relations. Clearly, military force would play a major role in such a system, and would be used both within a
bloc and between blocs.
In a cooperative multipolar system, relations within and between blocs would usually be solved by diplomacy,
international law, mediation, or the use of international institutions. Such a system would be inherently more flexible
than either unipolar or bipolar systems. Members could move from one bloc to the other. Coalitions of blocs would
come and go fairly frequently. Logically, military force would have a relatively limited role in a cooperative multipolar
system, and would probably find greater use in preserving internal order within states than in resolving conflicts
between them.
In a conflictual multipolar system, military force would be used to:
contain or deter a core state that seeks to expand its power to an extent that potentially destabilizes the system
preserve order within a bloc or within the states that constitute a bloc
expand the power of an aggressively ambitious bloc or state seeking leadership of a bloc
In a cooperative multipolar system, military force would be used to restrain a renegade or to reinforce the rules of the
system.
The energy for change in a multipolar system would come from within the states grouped in blocs. Changes in the
various publics' sense of identity would influence foreign policy and cause the coalitions in the system to ebb and
flow. A changing sense of identity might cause individual states to move from one bloc to another if blocs are defined
by culture or ideology rather than geography. Internal factors might also cause the weakening or strengthening of
blocs, which would require the other states in the bloc to take steps either to prop them up or to contain them.

The Role of the United States
In any future international system, the American role will largely be determined by internal factors, especially success
or failure at resolving key social conflicts, resuscitating the economy, and rejecting isolationism. This final element is
vital. The isolationist tradition runs deep in the American psyche. The activism that began before World War II and
continued to the end of the Cold War may prove to be an aberration rather than a sea change in the American strategic
tradition. Thus there is always the chance that internal problems will lead us to retreat from the responsibilities of
world leadership. Furthermore, failure to craft a coherent post-Cold War national security strategy will exacerbate the
isolationist tendency.
What, then, are the specific implications for the US Army of each feasible type of future international system?
Unipolar Systems
Military force would have immense utility in a conflictual unipolar system. The United States would thus need a very
large and mobile Army. Given our domestic demographics, this could be sustained only by a draft. Since the United
States could find itself fighting relatively well-armed second-tier powers as well as preserving order on the periphery,
we would need a wide range of capabilities from ballistic missile defense and conventional warfighting to foreign
internal defense. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction would elevate the importance of counterterrorism for
the Army. Most important, a conflictual unipolar system probably would force the Army to undertake sustained
garrison and occupation duties in other states. Typically, garrison and occupation troops are drawn either from allies or
from second-quality national units. The US Army could thus find itself replicating past imperial armies from ancient
Rome to modern Iraq with a clear distinction in quality and mission between first-line and second-line forces.
Combined operations would not be significant.
In a cooperative unipolar system the US Army could be much smaller. It would need to retain some conventional
warfighting capability to prevent the system from transforming into a bipolar one, and an equal capability for foreign
internal defense and other forms of stability-building on the periphery. Unlike the situation in the conflictual unipolar
system, the United States could count on allies for more enforcement actions, and thus coalition warfare and combined
operations would be more important. Our role would be to provide the type of high technology, high mobility, and
special capabilities missing from our allies. Traditional infantry and armor, for example, would be less significant than
special operations forces, sophisticated command and control, and advanced air defense. In addition, forward presence
would fully replace forward deployment as a key element of our national military strategy. Reconstitution and largescale mobilization would not be important, so the Total Force concept would have to be redesigned. The reserve
component would be focused on domestic rather than warfighting missions.
Bipolar Systems
The Army in a conflictual bipolar system would be similar to that of the Cold War. Basically, it would include two
elements. One would be designed to deter, contain, and, if necessary, defeat the other superpower. This would clearly
require continuation of the Total Force and demand a reserve component with robust warfighting capability. The other
element of the Army would be designed to preserve order within the US bloc, and thus would stress special operations,
foreign internal defense, and counterinsurgency. To phrase it differently, the Army would develop distinct highintensity and low-intensity components. By contrast, the Army would be small and relatively unimportant in a
cooperative bipolar system. We would be prepared to lead coalitions in any conflicts that occurred when diplomatic
measures failed. The Army would be a highly mobile, high-readiness, but relatively small force serving as the
vanguard to coalitions. Support to the UN (or its successor) would probably be significant. From a leadership
perspective, the Army would be forced to deal with operations in which the United States is a secondary participant
rather than the leader, thus amplifying the importance of assisting allies or friends in the training of competent leaders.
Multipolar Systems
The Army in a conflictual multipolar system also would include two elements--one to deter, fight, and defeat other
core powers, and the second designed to preserve order on the periphery. Unlike a bipolar system, a conflictual

multipolar system would require the Army to be prepared to fight any one of several potential first-tier enemies, thus
demanding greater doctrinal and leadership flexibility. Security assistance would be important, so the Army would
need to give special emphasis to all of the various skills attendant to it. Again, the reserve component would need to
preserve its warfighting capability. A cooperative multipolar system would require the smallest US Army. Most
missions would entail foreign internal defense, with the occasional need to contribute to a coalition of core forces.
Conclusions
The notion of a global system is relatively new. Throughout most of history, the world was composed of a number of
disconnected regional balances. It was thus entirely possible to have a unipolar Chinese system, a multipolar Indian
system, and a bipolar Mediterranean system coexisting. The world is simply too interconnected for this to occur again.
In the future, a given region may be more or less bipolar or multipolar than the global system, but the main global
configuration will shape all regional systems to an important degree.
Despite the fact that the nature of the future international system will be a principal determinant of the force structure,
doctrine, and missions of the Army, the Army will have only a limited role in shaping the nature of the system. As
with demographics, technology, and other factors, the Army is influenced by systemic change rather than controlling
or guiding it. What Army strategists must do, then, is remain vigilant for signs that the post-Cold War system is
coalescing into one or another of the three broadly stated forms. Indicators of an emerging preference for a particular
form could include domestic and international consensus on the guiding principles of the system, especially those
concerning the acceptable use of force. Once indicators begin to appear, planners skilled at system-level thinking can
begin the task of making the Army an effective organization in whatever configuration the future brings.
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